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"Political Competition Beyond Ethnic Politics in Africa" published on by Oxford University Press.

Much of the literature on electoral politics in Africa has focused on one mechanism of electoral mobilization: reliance on shared ethnic identity between politicians and voters. On the contrary, the author argues that politicians pursue two distinct modes of nonprogrammatic electoral mobilization: (1) bydirectlyrelying on the support of voters from one's own ethnic background, and (2) byindirectlyworking through electoral intermediaries—local leaders who command moral authority, control resources, and can influence the electoral behavior of their dependents. Yet the power of local leaders varies greatly; hence the option to use electoral intermediaries is not available in all settings. The choice of electoral mobilization affects national electoral outcomes: by severing the direct link between politicians and voters, intermediaries reduce a campaign's reliance on shared identity and create cross-ethnic electorates. The evidence for this argument is based on original interviews with political leaders collected during fieldwork in Senegal and Benin during the 2006–7 electoral season, media coverage of elections, and a historical analysis of first mass elections in the 1950s.

Much of the literature on electoral politics in Africa has focused on one mechanism of electoral mobilization reliance on shared ethnic identity between politicians and voters. On the contrary, the author argues that politicians pursue two distinct modes of nonprogrammatic electoral mobilization: (1) by directly relying on the support of voters from one's own ethnic background, and (2) by indirectly working through electoral intermediaries-local leaders who command moral authority, control resources, and can influence the electoral behavior of their dependents. Yet the power of local leaders varies greatly; hence the option to use electoral intermediaries is not available in all settings. The choice of electoral mobilization affects national electoral outcomes: by severing the direct link between politicians and voters, intermediaries reduce a campaign's reliance on shared identity and create cross-ethnic electorates. The evidence for this argument is based on original interviews with political leaders collected during fieldwork in Senegal and Benin during the 2006-7 electoral season, media coverage of elections, and a historical analysis of first mass elections in the 1950s. (World Politics / SWP)

Political scientists working on clientelism have become interested in the relationships between brokers and the politicians and parties for whom they work. In most of this research, brokers are seen as inherently disloyal and normally act against the interests of their patrons, unless monitoring efforts are enacted. In contrast, we argue that territorial brokers have strong incentives to construct long-term, dependent relationships with their patrons, which diminishes the likelihood of cheating, while their patrons also wish to maintain durable ties with brokers to hold an assured voter base. We argue that politicians prefer brokers who have a good reputation for providing their voters with goods and assuring their votes. Still, sometimes brokers go rogue and cheat on their bosses. This study, which is based on more than fifty in-depth interviews with both local politicians and brokers in Mexico City, examines the conditions under which brokers remain loyal and those that promote cheating. We identify two factors that explain this variation—electoral competitiveness and the level of resource autonomy between brokers and politicians. Non-autonomous brokers working under conditions of low competition tend to have high probabilities of remaining loyal, while independent brokers working under high competitiveness will often resort to cheating.

El artículo se propone examinar y cuestionar la categoría de "clientelismo" en su acepción instrumental, a la luz del estudio empírico de las actividades de los mediadores políticos en una provincia del norte argentino. A través de un abordaje metodológico cualitativo, se estudia la actividad cotidiana de dirigentes con diferentes cargos electivos. Se muestra cómo el papel de los mediadores no sólo involucra a individuos y grupos particulares, sino también colectivos sociales y territoriales, objeto de la distribución de bienes públicos que producen beneficios colectivos. Se plantea que la elección de los destinatarios de los bienes difícilmente coincide con la simple evaluación costo-beneficio que supone la noción instrumental de clientelismo, ya que implica más bien un trabajo de reconstrucción y producción de las problemáticas específicas de los integrantes de las bases electorales. El modo de distribuir recursos es filtrado por la persona del mediador, quien los asigna según su conocimiento del territorio representado y orientaciones de política general. Se cuestiona, así, el dualismo entre vínculos clientelares y programáticos, mostrando que la distribución de bienes públicos por parte de los mediadores políticos siempre está guiada por criterios simbólicos y/o programáticos. Se propone así una re-conceptualización de la noción de clientelismo que dé cuenta de la dimensión de la representación política que involucra.

Individual electoral clientelism involves the allocation of handouts to voters around elections. Why is this strategy common in some contexts but not in others? This article demonstrates that ethnic group institutional structure helps to explain this variation. Where ethnic groups are organized hierarchically and have centralized leadership, politicians leverage this infrastructure to mobilize voters wholesale. Where they are not, politicians forge linkages directly with voters, resulting in more electoral clientelism. I provide evidence from a set of African countries, where there is variation in the social structure of ethnic and religious groups. I show that electoral clientelism is more widespread in countries where ethnic groups have a decentralized organization. An individual-level analysis of electoral clientelism in 15 African countries further shows that members of decentralized groups are most likely to receive electoral handouts. The findings contribute to the comparative literature on clientelism and highlight how the organizational structure of intermediaries can shape strategies of clientelism.

The electoral reforms of 1883-5 created a mass electorate and transformed English political culture. A new breed of professional organisers emerged in the constituencies in the form of full-time partyagents, who handled registration, electioneering and the day-to-day political, social and educational work of local parties; they performed a vital role as intermediaries between politics at Westminster and at grass-roots level, bridging the gap between "high" and "low" politics. This book examines the agents not only as political figures, but also as men (and occasionally women) determinedto establish their status as professionals. It addresses key questions about the nationalisation of electoral politics in this period, demonstrating the importance of understanding the interactions between the centre and the constituencies, and showing that while the agents' professional networks contributed to a growing uniformity in certain aspects of party organisation, local forces continued to play a vital role in British political life. It also provides a fresh perspective on the evolution of the modern British political system, shedding new light on debates about how effectively the Liberal and Conservative parties adapted to the challenges of mass politics after 1885. Dr Kathryn Rix is Assistant Editor of the House of Commons, 1832-1945 project at the History of Parliament

Why do ethnic politics emerge in some ethnically diverse societies but not others? Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, Dominika Koter argues that the prevailing social structures of a country play a central role in how politicians attempt to mobilize voters. In particular, politicians consider the strength of local leaders, such as chiefs or religious dignitaries, who have historically played a crucial role in many parts of rural Africa. Local leaders can change the electoral dynamics by helping politicians secure votes among people of different ethnicities. Ethnic politics thus can be avoided where there are local leaders who can serve as credible electoral intermediaries between voters and politicians. Koter shows that there is widespread variation in the standing of local leaders across Africa, as a result of long-term historical trends, which has meant that politicians have mobilized voters in qualitatively different ways, resulting in different levels of ethnic politics across the continent.

The objective of this study is to analyze the institutional normativity and political dynamics of the province of Tucumán (Argentina) during the decade of 1870, in the context of the tensions derived from the conformation of the Argentine State. This study in the ield of political history is centered in the analysis of the electoral practices of clubs and committees in the province of Tucumán and their "condescending" relations with working class sectors, without ignoring the central role achieved by the provincial and national State as producer of electoral normativity, as well as a principal actor in the elections. Another aspect of the work involves exploring the functioning of the clubs and committees and their relation with working class sectors, which were generally veriied from a "top to bottom" perspective, through intermediaries(overseers, judges and campaign managers) in a relationship that political historiography has identiied as passive, and whose principal goal was improving the eficacy of previously constructed networks of patronage. These elements allow anappreciation of the way in which in 1870, the incoporation of the leadership of the province of Tucuman into the national political order allowed for the coniguration of a dynamic of institutional stability, founded on respect for constitutional norms that constituted the system´s main source of legitimacy. ; El objetivo de este artículo es analizar la normativa institucional y la dinámica política de la provincia de Tucumán (Argentina) durante la década de 1870, en el marco de las tensiones derivadas de la conformación del Estado argentino. El artículo está centrado en el análisis de las prácticas electorales de los clubes y comités de la provinciade Tucumán y sus relaciones "hacia abajo" con los sectores populares, lo que no implica desconocer el rol central que desempeñó el Estado provincial y nacional, no sólo como productor de la normativa electoral, sino también como actor que participaba activamente en las elecciones. Otro aspecto del trabajo explora el funcionamiento de los clubes y comités y sus relaciones con los sectores populares, que generalmente se veriicaron de arriba hacia abajo, a través de intermediarios(capataces, jueces y comisarios de campaña), en una relación que la historiografía política ha caliicado como pasiva y cuyo principal propósito era mejorar la eicacia de las redes clientelares construidas. Estos aspectos nos permiten apreciar cómo en 1870 la incorporación de la dirigencia de la provincia de Tucumán a un orden político nacional permitió conigurar una dinámica de estabilidad institucional, fundada en el respeto de las normas constitucionales que constituyeron la fuente principal de legitimidad del sistema. ; L'objectif de cet article est d'analyser les normes et les processus politiques de la province de Tucumán (Argentine) pendant la décennie 1870, dans le cadre des tensions découlant de la conformation de l'État argentin. L'article est axé sur l'analyse des pratiques électorales des clubs et des comités de la province de Tucumán, ainsi que sur les relations que ceux-ci entretenaient avec les secteurs populaires, cequi n'implique pas la méconnaissance du rôle central qui a joué l'État provincial et national, non seulement comme producteur des règlements électoraux, mais aussi comme acteur dynamique des élections. Un autre aspect du travail consiste à explorer le fonctionnement des clubs et des comités et leurs relations avec les secteurs populaires à travers des intermédiaires (contremaîtres, juges et commissaires decampagne), dans une relation qualiié par l'historiographie politique comme passive et dont le principal objectif était d'améliorer l'eficacité des réseaux clientélaires. Ces aspects nous permettent d'apprécier comment l'intégration des dirigeants de la province de Tucumán à l'ordre politique national en 1870, a permis un équilibre institutionnel, fondé sur le respect des normes constitutionnelles qui constituaientla principale source de légitimité du système.

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar la normativa institucional y la dinámica política de la provincia de Tucumán (Argentina) durante la década de 1870, en el marco de las tensiones derivadas de la conformación del Estado argentino. El artículo está centrado en el análisis de las prácticas electorales de los clubes y comités de la provincia de Tucumán y sus relaciones "hacia abajo" con los sectores populares, lo que no implica desconocer el rol central que desempeñó el Estado provincial y nacional, no sólo como productor de la normativa electoral, sino también como actor que participaba activamente en las elecciones. Otro aspecto del trabajo explora el funcionamiento de los clubes y comités y sus relaciones con los sectores populares, que generalmente se verificaron de arriba hacia abajo, a través de intermediarios (capataces, jueces y comisarios de campaña), en una relación que la historiografía política ha calificado como pasiva y cuyo principal propósito era mejorar la eficacia de las redes clientelares construidas. Estos aspectos nos permiten apreciar cómo en 1870 la incorporación de la dirigencia de la provincia de Tucumán a un orden político nacional permitió configurar una dinámica de estabilidad institucional, fundada en el respeto de las normas constitucionales que constituyeron la fuente principal de legitimidad del sistema. ; The objective of this study is to analyze the institutional normativity and political dynamics of the province of Tucumán (Argentina) during the decade of 1870, in the context of the tensions derived from the conformation of the Argentine State. This study in the field of political history is centered in the analysis of the electoral practices of clubs and committees in the province of Tucumán and their "condescending" relations with working class sectors; without ignoring the central role achieved by the provincial and national State as producer of electoral normativity, as well as a principal actor in the elections. Another aspect of the work involves exploring the functioning of the clubs and committees and their relation with working class sectors, which were generally verified from a "top to bottom" perspective, through intermediaries (overseers, judges and campaign managers) in a relationship that political historiography has identified as passive, and whose principal goal was improving the efficacy of previously constructed networks of patronage. These elements allow an appreciation of the way in which in 1870, the incoporation of the leadership of the province of Tucuman into the national political order allowed for the configuration of a dynamic of institutional stability, founded on respect for constitutional norms that constituted the system´s main source of legitimacy. ; L'objectif de cet article est d'analyser les normes et les processus politiques de la province de Tucumán (Argentine) pendant la décennie 1870, dans le cadre des tensions découlant de la conformation de l'État argentin. L'article est axé sur l'analyse des pratiques électorales des clubs et des comités de la province de Tucumán, ainsi que sur les relations que ceux-ci entretenaient avec les secteurs populaires, ce qui n'implique pas la méconnaissance du rôle central qui a joué l'État provincial et national, non seulement comme producteur des règlements électoraux, mais aussi comme acteur dynamique des élections. Un autre aspect du travail consiste à explorer le fonctionnement des clubs et des comités et leurs relations avec les secteurs populaires à travers des intermédiaires (contremaîtres, juges et commissaires de campagne), dans une relation qualifié par l'historiographie politique comme passive et dont le principal objectif était d'améliorer l'efficacité des réseaux clientélaires. Ces aspects nous permettent d'apprécier comment l'intégration des dirigeants de la province de Tucumán à l'ordre politique national en 1870, a permis un équilibre institutionnel, fondé sur le respect des normes constitutionnelles qui constituaient la principale source de légitimité du système. ; Fil: Bravo, Maria Celia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Tucumán. Instituto Superior de Estudios Sociales. Universidad Nacional de Tucumán. Instituto Superior de Estudios Sociales; Argentina

El artículo se propone examinar y cuestionar la categoría de 'clientelismo' en su acepción instrumental, a la luz del estudio empírico de las actividades de los mediadores políticos en una provincia del norte argentino. A través de un abordaje metodológico cualitativo, se estudia la actividad cotidiana de dirigentes con diferentes cargos electivos. Se muestra cómo el papel delos mediadores no sólo involucra a individuos y grupos particulares, sino también colectivos sociales y territoriales, objeto de la distribución de bienes públicos que producen beneficios colectivos. Se plantea que la elección de los destinatarios de los bienes difícilmente coincide con la simple evaluación costo-beneficio que supone la noción instrumental de clientelismo,ya que implica más bien un trabajo de reconstrucción y producción de las problemáticas específicas de los integrantes de las bases electorales. El modo de distribuir recursos es filtrado por la persona del mediador, quien los asigna según su conocimiento del territorio representado y orientaciones de política general.Se cuestiona, así, el dualismo entre vínculos clientelares y programáticos, mostrando que la distribución de bienes públicos por parte de los mediadores políticos siempre está guiada por criterios simbólicos y/o programáticos. Se propone así una re-conceptualización de la noción de clientelismo que dé cuenta de la dimensión de la representación política que involucra. ; The article aims at examining and questioning the notion of "clientelism" in its instrumental sense, based on an empirical study of the activities of political mediators in a northern Argentinian province. The daily doings of local leaders in various elective positions is studied with a qualitative methodological approach. The work reveals that the role of mediators involves not only individuals and particular groups, but also social and territorial groups who are the target of the distribution of public goods yielding collective gains. It is argued that the choice of the beneficiaries of the goods is hardly ever consistent with a simple cost-benefit assessment entailed by the instrumental notion of clientelism, as it rather implies rebuilding and solving the specific problems of the electoral basis' members. The method of allocating resources is filtered by the mediator, who assigns them according to her/his knowledge of the represented territory and general policy orientations. The dualism between clientelistic and programmatic links is thus questioned, showing that the distribution of public goods by political mediators is always guided by symbolic and/or programmatic criteria. Thus, the author suggests a re-conceptualization of the notion of clientelism that accounts for the political representation dimension involved in this notion. ; Fil: Ortiz de Rozas, Victoria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento; Argentina

In the last decade, online communication has become a cornerstone of business communication because, among other things, is a quick and easy way to connect to the desired target audience (and especially the younger ones) at any time of day and without intermediaries that can manipulate the message. Political parties have also begun to use these means to interact with their fans and, especially in election campaigns, promote the mobilization of its supporters. Because it is a new way of communication and is still expanding, not much research has done in this field and, the existing ones, focus on the U.S. elections. This article aims to highlight the importance of these new channels are gaining in political communication in Spain, analyzing the use of new technologies by the two main political parties (PSOE and PP) during the last general elections and , thus opening a line of studies in this direction. ; En la última década, la comunicación online se ha convertido en uno de los pilares de la comunicación empresarial debido a que, entre otras cosas, es una manera fácil y rápida de conectar con el público objetivo deseado (y sobre todo con los más jóvenes) a cualquier hora del día y sin intermediarios que puedan manipular el mensaje. Los partidos políticos también han empezado a utilizar estos medios para interactuar con sus seguidores y, sobre todo en campañas electorales, fomentar la movilización de sus adeptos. Debido a que es un tema muy novedoso y que aún está en plena expansión, no hay muchas investigaciones al respecto y, las existentes, se centran en las elecciones norteamericanas. Este artículo trata de poner de manifiesto la importancia que estos nuevos canales están adquiriendo dentro de la comunicación política en nuestro país, analizando el uso de las nuevas tecnologías por parte de los dos principales partidos políticos (PSOE y PP) durante las últimas elecciones generales y, de esta forma, abrir una línea de estudios en esta dirección. ; Dans la dernière decade, la communication on line est devenue un des piliers de la communication des entreprises du au fait que, entre autres, elle est une manière facile et rapide à contacter avec le public objectif souhaité (et surtout avec ceux plus jeunes) à toute heure du jour et sans des intermédiaires qui peuvent manipuler le message. Les partis politiques ont aussi commencé à utiliser ces moyens pour interagir avec leurs partisans et, surtout dans des campagnes électorales, favoriser la mobilisation de leurs versés. Du au fait de la nouveauté du sujet et qu'il est encore en pleine expansion, il n'y a pas beaucoup de recherches et, ce qui se sont faites, se centrent auxs élections américaines. Cet article essaye de mettre en évidence l'importance que ces nouveaux canaux acquièrent dans la communication politique dans notre pays, en analysant l'utilisation des nouvelles technologies par les deux principaux partis politiques (PSOE et PP) pendant les dernières élections générales et, de cette manière, ouvrir une ligne d'études dans cette direction.

Objective/Context: In advanced democracies, political parties distribute their resources internally to make themselves stronger. Few studies examine the role of parties as intermediaries between campaign resources and candidates. Hence, we examine how political parties assigned campaign resources in 2014 election for federal deputies. Methodology: We tested the following hypothesis: resources from parties will be distributed to favor candidates holding office, at the expense of the party's organizational structure. Our hypothesis is grounded on the personalistic trait surrounding Brazil's political-electoral dynamics. Conclusions: Data indicates that parties assign their financial resources considering candidate's individual electoral potential, at the expense of their organizational structure. Such a strategy reveals that the organizational structure of Brazilian parties is not related to the party's strategy during elections. Originality: We show how often Brazilian political parties are "hijacked" by their elected representatives and, regardless of their organizational strength, party resources end up reinforcing the lack of competiveness and internal democracy within the organization.

Si los cambios de preferencias electorales durante la campaña se han explicado bajo el supuesto teórico de una alta institucionalización del sistema de partidos, entonces cabe preguntarse: ¿bajo qué condiciones ocurre el cambio electoral en democracias con baja institucionalización? Utilizando datos originales del Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) para comparar dos países, argumento que en una democracia de baja institucionalización el cambio de preferencias electorales ocurre debido a: 1) una intensidad menor de anclaje del voto y 2) a la heterogeneidad de los intermediarios político personales e impersonales. ; If changes in electoral preferences during campaign has been explained under the theoretical assumption of highly institutionalized party system, therefore: under what conditions citizens' electoral preferences change in a low institutionalized democracy? Comparing two countries from the original dataset of the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP), I claim that in a democracy with a low institutionalized party system, electoral changes appear due to (1) a low intensity of voting anchorage and (2) the heterogeneity of personal and impersonal informational intermediaries.